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ABSTRACT 
 
This article considers the feasibility of the adoption by the Council of Europe Member States 
of a multilateral binding treaty, called the Intelligence Codex (the Codex), aimed at 
regulating the working methods of state intelligence agencies. The Codex is the result of 
deep concerns about mass surveillance practices conducted by the United States’ National 
Security Agency (NSA) and the United Kingdom Government Communications Headquarters 
(GCHQ). The article explores the reasons for such a treaty. To that end, it identifies the 
discriminatory nature of the United States’ and the United Kingdom’s domestic legislation, 
pursuant to which foreign cyber surveillance programmes are operated, which reinforces 
the need to broaden the scope of extraterritorial application of the human rights treaties. 
Furthermore, it demonstrates that the US and UK foreign mass surveillance se practices 
interferes with the right to privacy of communications and cannot be justified under Article 
17 ICCPR and Article 8 ECHR. As mass surveillance seems set to continue unabated, the 
article supports the calls from the Council of Europe to ban cyber espionage and mass 
untargeted cyber surveillance. The response to the proposal of a legally binding Intelligence 
Codexhard law solution to mass surveillance problem from the 47 Council of Europe 
governments has been so far muted, however a soft law option may be a viable way 
forward.  
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Introduction 
 
 
Peacetime espionage is by no means a new phenomenon in international relations.1 It has 
always been a prevalent method of gathering intelligence from afar, including through 
electronic means.2  However, foreign cyber surveillance on the scale revealed by Edward 
Snowden performed by the United States National Security Agency (NSA), the United 
Kingdom Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) and their Five Eyes partners3 
                                                      
1 Geoffrey B. Demarest, ‘Espionage in International Law’ (1996) 24 Denver Journal of 
International Law and Policy 321, 326. Demarest defines espionage as ‘the consciously 
deceitful collection of information, ordered by a government or organization hostile to or 
suspicious of those the information concerns, accomplished by humans authorised by the 
target to do the collecting’.  
2 Russell Buchan, ‘The International Legal Regulation of State-Sponsored Cyber Espionage’ in 
Anna Maria Osula and Henry Roigas (eds), International Cyber Norms: Legal, Policy and 
Industry Perspective (NATO CCD COE Publications, Tallinn 2016) 65-86. 
3 Privacy International, ‘The Five Eyes’ < https://www.privacyinternational.org/node/51> 
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is a relatively recent activity. It can be defined as targeted and untargeted interception, bulk 
collection and storage of digital communications (content and metadata4). Foreign cyber 
surveillance comprises both transnational and extraterritorial surveillance.5 It is conducted 
through the use of a variety of tools and programmes, such as PRISM and Tempora. The 
latter, predominantly used by the UK intelligence services, allows accessing of the global 
communications through tapping of the fibre-optic underwater cables, giving GCHQ the 
ability to monitor up to 600 million communications every day.6 NSA’s PRISM enables direct 
access of the customer data from nine internet firms, including Google, Microsoft and 
Yahoo. 7 
This article examines the legality of foreign cyber surveillance by NSA and GCHQ from 
the perspective of international human rights law, specifically the right to privacy under 
Article 17 International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights 1966 (ICCPR)8 and Article 8 
European Convention on Human Rights 1950 (ECHR).9 Since these activities are likely to 
continue, important questions regarding the future protection of privacy of millions of 
people world-wide must be addressed both nationally and internationally. The United 
Nations (UN) together with regional human rights bodies and organizations have voiced 
concerns, but these seem to no availfall on deaf ears. This article therefore explores the 
viability of a legally binding, multilateral cyber surveillance treaty to regulate the practices 
of intelligence gathering at home and abroad. Such a treaty, called the ‘Intelligence Codex’ 
(the Codex), has recently been proposed by the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human 
Rights of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE).10  It is a multilateral 
‘no-spy’ regional instrument among European countries, which aims to lay down rules 
                                                                                                                                                                     
The Five Eyes alliance is a secretive, global surveillance arrangement of states comprised of 
the United States National Security Agency, the United Kingdom Government 
Communications Headquarters, Canada’s Communications Security Establishment Canada, 
the Australian Signals Directorate and New Zealand’s Government Communications Security 
Bureau. 
4 Privacy International, ‘Metadata’ < https://www.privacyinternational.org/node/53> 
Metadata is information about the communication and include, inter alia, the location that 
the communication derived from, the device that sent it, the time it was sent and 
information about the recipient.  
5 Ashley Deeks, ‘An International Legal Framework for Surveillance’ (2015) 55 Virginia 
Journal of International Law 292-367, 299-300. Transnational surveillance refers to the 
surveillance of communications that cross state borders, including those that begin and end 
overseas but incidentally pass through the collecting state. Extraterritorial surveillance 
refers to the surveillance of communications that take place entirely overseas.   
6 Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights of the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe, ‘Mass Surveillance. Who is Watching the Watchers?’ (Doc 13734, 2015) 6.  
7 ibid. 
8 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered 
into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR), art 17. 
9 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (opened for 
signature 4 November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953) 213 UNTS 222 (ECHR),  
art 8. 
10 Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe Resolution 2045 (21 April 2015). 
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governing cooperation for purposes of fighting terrorism and organized crime.11 It has been 
put to the ministers of the 47 Council of Europe Member States, but has already met with  
one rejection from the Netherlands. The Dutch government viewed the idea of banning the 
use of states’ investigatory powers against each other for instance, for political purposes as 
unrealistic, having the potential to ‘irresponsibly limit intelligence collection’.12 
This article takes a different view and considers the Codex as a step in the right 
direction. The ensuing discussion is divided into five sections. Section one outlines the 
domestic legal bases authorising foreign cyber surveillance and demonstrates that they 
unjustly discriminate on the basis of nationality. Section two makes a case for the 
extraterritorial application of human rights treaties in the context of cyber surveillance 
abroad. Section three shows how cyber surveillance amounts to an interference with the 
right to privacy of communications and section four finds no justifications for such 
interference, as set out in Article 17 ICCPR and Article 8(2) ECHR. This leads to the inevitable 
conclusion in section five that foreign cyber surveillance should no longer be permitted to 
operate in an international regulatory legal vacuum. To that end, this section supports the 
idea of a legally binding agreement as proposed by the Council of Europe. 
 
 
1. Cyber Surveillance Programmes and Their Domestic Legal Bases 
 
 
The activities of NSA and GCHQ are secretive by definition. However, the global 
condemnation of the US and the UK’s sponsored surveillance has caused the US 
government to admit the existence of PRISM. Whilst the UK confirmed that it has been the 
recipient of data from PRISM via its intelligence sharing relationship with the US,13 the 
government has adopted a ‘neither confirm nor deny’ policy towards Tempora.14 
PRISM operates pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).15 
This provision was introduced by the FISA Amendment Act (FAA) 2008, which revised the 
previous surveillance rules. The FAA adopts different approaches depending on whether the 
targets of surveillance are ‘United States persons’,16 or ‘non-United States’ persons17 and 
may be summarised as follows: (a) US persons can be targeted only upon showing a 
                                                      
11 ibid, para 17.4. 
12 Matthijs Koot, ‘Dutch Government Rejects Idea of No-Spy Agreements Between European 
Countries’ (13 March 2015)< https://blog.cyberwar.nl/2015/03/dutch-minister-of-the-
interior-rejects-eu-pace-proposal-omtzigt-of-anti-spy-treaty-between-european-countries/>. 
13 Liberty, ‘Liberty’s Evidence to the Intelligence and Security Committee’s Inquiry into 
Privacy and Security’ (February 2014) < https://www.liberty-human-
rights.org.uk/sites/default/files/Liberty%20evidence%20to%20the%20ISC%20inquiry%20int
o%20privacy%20and%20security%20(Feb%202014).pdf>, 3. 
14 ibid. 
15 50 U.S.C § 1881(a). 
16 50 U.S.C § 1881(c). United States persons are defined as American citizens or non-citizens 
who are legal permanent residents in the US. 
17 50 U.S.C § 1881(a). 
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probable cause to believing that he/she is an agent of a foreign power, 18 whereas non-US 
persons can be targeted showing a lower ‘reasonable belief’ standard; (b) US persons may 
only be targeted if there is a judicial warrant from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Court (FISC), whereas non-US persons can be targeted without FISC approved individual 
warrants; (c) the minimization requirements for communications of US persons do not 
extend fully to non-US persons located outside the US.19 
The UK surveillance powers to intercept foreign communications are set out 
primarily in the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA), soon to be replaced by 
the Investigatory Powers Act 2016Bill.20 RIPA too makes a distinction, but between ‘internal’ 
and ‘external’ communications. ‘Internal interceptions’ may only be conducted on the basis 
of individual warrants,21 which must name, or describe a person, or single set of premises to 
be intercepted. 22 Conversely, the interception of ‘external communications’, 23 i.e. the 
‘means of communications sent or received outside the British Islands’,24 are  very loosely 
controlled.  A warrant does not need to identify a specific person, or premises but need only 
contain the description of intercepted material. There is no upper limit to the number of 
external communications that may be intercepted on the basis of s8(4) RIPA and warrants 
granted pursuant to this section can last for either three, or six months and be renewed 
indefinitely.  
The discriminatory nature of s 702 FAA 2008 and s 8 RIPA 2000 is clear, but it is just a 
part of a wider US and its Five Eyes partners’ policy stance post 11 September 2001, which 
places emphasis on citizenship as a basis for fundamental rights.25  This therefore requires 
that the rights of non-citizens be clarified under international law. The fundamental 
recognition that all persons by virtue of their essential humanity are equal and should enjoy 
all human rights without discrimination is contained in Article 2(1) of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights;26 Articles 227 and 2628  of the ICCPR;  Articles 129 and 230 of the 
                                                      
18 Richard A. Clarke et al, The NSA Report. Liberty and Security in the Changing World. The 
President’s Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies (Princeton 
University Press 2013) 86-87. 
19 ibid. 
20 UK Parliament, ‘Investigatory Powers Act 2016. Royal Assent (Hansard) 29 November 
2016.Bill. Explanatory Notes’ (18 May 2016) 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/cbill/2016-2017/0002/en/17002en03.htm> 
21 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 s 5. 
22 RIPA 2000 s 8(1). 
23 RIPA 2000 s 8(4)-(6). 
24 RIPA 2000 s 20. 
25 Marko Milanovic, ‘Foreign Surveillance and Human Rights, Part 1: Do Foreigners Deserve 
Privacy?’ (EJIL: Talk! 25 November 2013) <http://www.ejiltalk.org/foreign-surveillance-and-
human-rights-part-1-do-foreigners-deserve-privacy/>.  
26 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948 UNGA Res 217 A(III) 
(UDHR) art 2(1).  
27 ICCPR supra note 8, art 2(1). 
28 ICCPR supra note 8, art 26.  
29 International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 16 December 
1966, entered into force 3 January 1976) UNTS 993 (ICESCR) art 1.  
30 ICESCR, ibid art 2. 
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International Covenant of on Economic Social and Cultural Rights 1976 (ICESCR); and Article 
1431 of the ECHR. The UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), a body of independent experts 
that monitors the implementation of the ICCPR by its state parties, is tasked with providing 
a guide to the Covenant’s interpretation. This the Committee does through issuing non-
country specific and non-legally binding general comments, with the purpose  to, inter alia, 
promote the effective implementation of the Covenant, clarify its requirements and 
stimulate the activities of state parties as well as international organizations in the 
promotion and protection of human rights.32  In  General Comment No. 15 in relation to the 
rights under the ICCPR, the HRC explained that the rights in the Covenant apply to everyone, 
irrespective of their nationality and the general rule is that each one of these rights must be 
guaranteed without discrimination between citizens and aliens. 33 The ICESCR likewise 
established that governments shall take progressive measures to the extent of available 
resources to protect the rights of everyone regardless of their citizenship.34 Thus, the 
fundamental principle dictates that human rights are presumptively owed to citizens and 
non-citizens alike, unless a particular treaty (or customary rule) allows for differential 
treatment. Both the ICCPR and the ICESCR permit states to draw distinctions between 
citizens and non-citizens, but only with respect to three categories of rights, namely political 
rights, freedom of movement and economic rights in developing countries.35 Thus, under 
Article 25 ICCPR, the right to participate in public affairs, to vote, to hold office and to have 
access to public services is guaranteed to citizens only.36 Similarly, Article 12(4) ICCPR 
provides that no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country, 37 
whilst the ICESCR Article 2(3) allows developing counties to ‘determine to what extent they 
would guarantee the economic rights recognized in the present Covenant to non-
nationals’.38 States therefore may not draw distinction between citizens and non-citizens as 
to social and cultural rights, with exception of the right to public participation and of 
movement. Having said that, international law, as well as state practice consistently 
sanctions discrimination and distinctions on the basis of nationality, which means that some 
discrimination on these grounds would be permissible.39 The HRC in its General Comment 
No. 18 clarified this by stating that ‘not every differentiation of treatment will constitute 
discrimination, if the criteria for such a differentiation are reasonable and objective and if 
the aim is to achieve a purpose, which is legitimate under the [International] Covenant [of 
Civil and Political Rights]’40 and is proportional to the achievement of that objective.41 The 
                                                      
31 ECHR, supra note 9, art 14. 
32 Ghandi, The Human Rights Committee and the Right of Individual Communication: Law 
and Practice (Ashgate Publishing 1998) 25. 
33 UNHRC, ‘General Comment No. 15. The Position of Aliens under the Covenant’ (1986) UN 
Doc HRI/Gen/1/Rev.9/(Vol.1) para 1-2.  
34 ICESCR, supra note 29 art 2.  
35 supra note 33 para 18. 
36 ICCPR, supra note 8 art 25.  
37 ICCPR, supra note 8 art 12(4).  
38 ICESCR, supra note 29 art 2(3).  
39 supra note 33 paras 23-30. 
40 UNRC, ‘General Comment No. 18: Non-Discrimination’ (1989) UN Doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 
para 13. 
 
 
 6 
‘objective and reasonable justification’ is also a criteria that the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR), an international court that rules on applications alleging violations of the 
European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), requires a state to satisfy in order to show 
that the difference in treatment was not discriminatory. In Burden v United Kingdom42 the 
Strasbourg Court held that ‘a difference of treatment is discriminatory if it has no objective 
and reasonable justification; in other words, if it does not pursue a legitimate aim and if 
there is not a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and 
the aim sought to be realised. The Contracting State enjoys a margin of appreciation in 
assessing whether and to what extent differences in otherwise similar situations justify a 
different treatment’.43 
States are obliged to ensure that measures taken in the struggle against terrorism do 
not discriminate in purpose, or effect on grounds of nationality and the principle of non-
discrimination must be observed in all matters, in particular in those concerning liberty, 
security and dignity of the person, equality before the courts and due process of law, as well 
as international cooperation in judicial and police matters.44 In guaranteeing certain rights 
to citizens only, the US and the UK laws breach the provisions of non-discrimination and 
equal treatment under the ICCPR and the ECHR, which as will be shown below, cannot be 
justified on objective and reasonable grounds. Indeed, ‘the unique position of the United 
States (and the United Kingdom) with regards to the physical infrastructure of the internet 
and the fact that the private companies based in the US collect and store huge amounts of 
data of persons residing anywhere in the world makes the exclusion of “non-US [and UK] 
persons” from any legal protection against mass surveillance simply intolerable-it may well 
lead to the destruction of the internet as we know it’.45 This reinforces the need to broaden 
the scope of the extraterritorial application of these states’ human rights obligations to 
apply to foreign cyber surveillance, as discussed next. 
 
2. Extraterritorial Application of the ICCPR and ECHR and Cyber Surveillance 
 
Article 17 ICCPR and Article 8 ECHR apply extraterritorially, which means that states must 
respect the right to privacy whenever individuals are within their territory as well as their 
jurisdiction.46 However, the US has long denied that it has obligations to respect and protect 
human rights outside its borders (territory), despite views to the contrary expressed by 
most international human rights courts and bodies.  
                                                                                                                                                                     
41 UNCHR (Sub-Commission), ‘Report by Special Rapporteur David Weissbrodt 2003/23’ 
(2003) UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/23. 
42 Burden v United Kingdom (App no 133378/05) (2008) ECHR 357 [GC]. 
43 ibid, para 60. 
44 supra, note 41 para 28. 
45 Council of Europe Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, ‘Mass Surveillance-
Report of the Parliamentary Assembly’ (2015) Doc 13734 45. 
46 American Civil Liberties Union, ‘Privacy Rights in the Digital Age. A Proposal for a New 
General Comment on the Right to Privacy under Article 17 of the International Covenant of 
Civil and Political Rights: A Draft Report and General Comment by the American Civil 
Liberties Union’ (2014) <https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/jus14-report-iccpr-
web-rel1.pdf> 28. 
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The jurisdictional scope of application of the ECHR and the ICCPR are set out in 
Article 147 and Article 2(1)48 respectively. The US has consistently held a narrow stance 
regarding extraterritorial application of the Covenant since its statement to the Human 
Rights Committee in 1995.49 This position has been based on Article 31(1) of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of the Treaties (VCLT), which requires that treaties should be read 
‘in accordance with the ordinary meaning …of [their] terms’. 50 The US approach is that 
obligations under the ICCPR will only arise if both conditions in Article 2(1) ICCPR are 
satisfied, that is an individual must be ‘within its territory’ and ‘subject to its jurisdiction’, 
which rules out the extraterritorial application of the ICCPR altogether. This interpretation, 
in particular in relation to foreign cyber surveillance, must be rejected in favour of the more 
expansive view taken by international bodies, according to which a state must ensure 
human rights within its territory and anywhere it has ‘effective control’ of either the 
territory, or a person. There are number of reasons for this. First, the narrow approach 
favoured by the US has been repeatedly criticized by the Human Rights Committee in its 
1994, 51  2006 and 2014 reports. 52  Secondly, the HRC endorsed the extraterritorial 
application of the Covenant, also relying on Article 31 VCLT, but unlike the US, the 
Committee invoked its ‘object and purpose’ to determine that the conditions contained in 
Article 2(1) ICCPR should not be determined conjunctively, but disjunctively. According to its 
General Comment No. 31, states must respect and ensure the rights laid down by the 
Covenant to anyone within the power or effective control of that state party, even if not 
                                                      
47 ECHR, supra note 9 art 1. 
48 ICCPR, supra note 8 art 2(1). 
49 UNHRC, ’Summary Record of the 1405th Meeting’ (24 April 1995) UN Doc CCPR/C/SR/1405. 
The US Government’s position was made clear in para 20: 
The Covenant was not regarded as having extraterritorial application (…) Article 2 of 
the Covenant expressly stated that each State party undertook to respect and ensure 
the rights recognized ‘to all individuals within its territory and subject to its 
jurisdiction’. That dual requirement restricted the scope of the Covenant to persons 
under the United States jurisdiction and within United states territory. 
50 Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties (adopted 22 May 1969) (1969) 1155 UNTS 
331 (VCLT) art 31(1). 
51 UNHRC, ‘Report of the Human Rights Committee’ (1995) UN Doc A/50/40 para 284: 
[the HRC] does not share the view [of the US government] that the Covenant lacks 
extraterritorial reach under all circumstances [because] such a view is contrary to 
the consistent interpretation of the Committee … that in special circumstances, 
persons may fall under the subject-matter jurisdiction of a State Party even when 
outside that State’s territory. 
52 UNHRC, ‘Concluding Observations on the US Report Under the ICCPR’ (2006) UN Doc 
CCPR/C/USA/CO/3; UNHRC, ‘Concluding Observations on the US Report Under the ICCPR’ 
(2014) UN Doc CCPR/C/USA/CO/3. Both reports state in para C.4 that: 
 The Committee regrets that the State Party continues to maintain its position that  
 the Covenant does not apply with respect to individuals under its jurisdiction but 
 outside its territory, despite the contrary interpretation of article 2(1) supported by  
the Committee’s established jurisprudence, the jurisprudence of the International 
Court of Justice and State practice. 
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situated within its territory.53 Additionally, the HRC considered that ‘state parties are 
required to give effect to the obligations under the Covenant in good faith’ pursuant to 
Article 26 of the VCLT.54 The HRC adopted this expansive approach in several cases, such as 
Lopez Burgos v Uruguay,55 Montego v Uruguay56  and in Munaf v Romania.57  Recently, the 
HRC in its General Comment No. 3558 concerning Article 9 ICCPR59 confirmed that ‘[s]tate 
[p]arties have an obligation to respect and ensure the rights under Article 9  to all persons 
who may be within the territory and to all persons subject to their jurisdiction’.60 When 
considering the US cyber surveillance activities in its 2014 report, the HRC clearly found that 
foreign surveillance implicates ICCPR, stating that the US  should ‘take all necessary 
measures to ensure that its surveillance activities, both within and outside the United States, 
conform to its obligations under the Covenant, including Article 17.’ 61  Thirdly, the 
established jurisprudence of other international courts, such as the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) also support the wider, 
extraterritorial application of human rights treaties. In the Legal Consequences of the 
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territories Advisory Opinion62 and the 
Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo,63 the ICJ concluded that the 
ICCPR was applicable ‘in respect to acts done by a State in the exercise of its jurisdiction 
outside its own territory’.64 By far the most developed and varied jurisprudence on the issue 
of extraterritoriality however  is that of the ECtHR interpreting Article 1 ECHR. The approach 
taken by the Strasbourg Court in Al-Skeini v United Kingdom65 clarified its earlier stance on 
the issue.66 The Court reaffirmed two basic models of state jurisdiction: the spatial model 
                                                      
53 UNHRC, ‘General Comment No. 31. The Nature of the General Legal Obligations Imposed 
on State Parties to the Covenant’ (2004) UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.1326 May 2004. 
54 supra note 50. 
55 Lopez Burgos v Uruguay (1979) UNHRC Communication No 52/1979 UN Doc 
CCPR/C/13/D/52/1979. 
56 Montego v Uruguay (1981) UNHRC Communication No 106/1981 UN Doc Supp No 40 (A 
138/40).  
57 Munaf v Romania (2006) UNHRC Communication No 1539/06 UN Doc CCPR/C/96/D. 
58 UNHRC, ‘General Comment No. 35. Article 9-Liberty and Security of Person’ (2014) UN 
Doc CCPR/C/GC/35. 
59 ICCPR, supra note 8 art 9.  
60 supra, note 58 para 63. 
61 supra note 52 para 22.  
62 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territories 
(Advisory Opinion) 2004 ICJ Reports 163. 
63 Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of 
Congo v Uganda) (Request for the Indication for Provisional Measures: Order) [2000] ICJ 
Reports 111.  
64 supra, note 62 para 111; DRC v Congo, ibid. 
65 Al-Skeini and Others v United Kingdom (App No 55721/07) [2011] ECHR 1093. 
66 Bankovic and Others v Belgium and Others (App No 52207/99) [2001] ECHR 890; Ilaşcu 
and Others v Moldova and Russia (App No 48787/99) (2005) 40 EHRR; Loizidou v Turkey 
(App No 15318/89) (1995) 23 EHRR 513; Issa and Others v Turkey (App No 31821/96) (2005) 
41 EHRR 27. 
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(jurisdiction as effective overall control by a state over an area, or territory)67 and the 
personal model (jurisdiction as an exercise of authority, or control by state agents over an 
individual),68 emphasising however that extraterritorial application of ECHR can only be 
exceptional and needs to be justified by reference to general international law.69 Post Al-
Skeini cases attest to a more expansive view towards the question of extraterritorial 
application of the Convention, with regards to both the personal (Jaloud v the 
Netherlands)70  and the spatial model (the so-called Nagorno-Karabakh cases).71  These 
cases are a clear indication of the trend in the ECtHR jurisprudence towards clearer, more 
factual and importantly more permissive approach,72 which also is in line with other human 
rights bodies.73  
Neither the HRC, nor the ECtHR has yet pronounced directly on the extraterritorial 
application of the ICCPR and ECHR to cases of cyber surveillance.74 Nevertheless, they may 
well be persuaded to do so, especially in the light of recent explicit acknowledgements from 
both the HRC and the UN General Assembly that extraterritorial surveillance raises human 
rights concerns. 75 In particular, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights report on The 
Right to Privacy in the Digital Age76  noted the circumstances when human rights obligations 
may be engaged  in the context of  extraterritorial surveillance. This will arise in relation to 
any person, irrespective of their nationality, or physical location whenever a state exercises 
effective control over the technical, or physical means through which privacy rights are 
interfered with, for example by direct tapping or penetration of the infrastructure, 
irrespective of whether or not the state exercise power or effective control over the 
individual rights bearer as such. 77 The US Upstream78 and the UK Tempora programmes are 
                                                      
67 supra, note 65 paras 138-139. 
68 ibid, paras 133-137. 
69 ibid. 
70 Jaloud v the Netherlands (App No 47708/08) (2014) EHRR. 
71 Chiragov and Others v Armenia (App No 13216/05) (2015); Sargsyan v Azerbaijan, (App 
No 40167/06) (2015). The Court adopted an expansive approach when applying the spatial 
model in these two cases. In its evaluation of the evidence confirming Armenian control 
over the Nagorno-Karabakh for example, the Court found a high level of Armenian influence 
in the region (including military, political and financial) and consequently effective control 
over it. 
72 Marko Milanovic, ‘Jurisdiction and Responsibility: Trends in the Jurisprudence of the 
Strasbourg Court’, in Anne van Aaken and Iulia Motoc (eds), The ECHR and General 
International Law (Oxford University Press, forthcoming). 
73 UNHRC General Comment No. 35, supra note 58; UNHRC forth periodic report, supra note 
62. 
74 There are three currently pending cyber surveillance cases before the ECtHR, alleging 
breach of Article 8 ECHR by GCHQ following Edward Snowden revelations-  
Bureau of Investigative Journalism and Alice Ross v UK (App No 62322/14); 
Big Brother Watch and Others v UK (App No 58179/13); 
10 Human Rights Organizations v UK (App No Index No IOR 60/1415/2015). 
75 supra note 61. 
76 UNGA, ‘Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 
the Right to Privacy in the Digital Age’ UN Doc A/HRC/27/37 30 (2014). 
77 ibid, para 34:  
 
 
 10 
designed to do exactly that and therefore in all probability engage these countries’ 
obligations under ICCPR (UK and US) and ECHR (UK). The same applies to the US PRISM, as it 
allows to directly access the servers of third parties that physically control the data, 
including Google, Microsoft and Yahoo.  In addition, Special Rapporteur Ben Emmerson QC 
was clear on this point observing that ‘[state’s jurisdiction] is not only engaged where State 
agents place data interceptors on fibre-optic cables travelling through their jurisdictions, but 
also where a State exercises regulatory authority over the telecommunications or Internet 
Service Providers that physically control the data’.79 
 
3. Cyber Surveillance as an Interference with the Right to Privacy of Communications  
 
Article 17 ICCPR prohibits ‘arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy, home or 
correspondence’80 and obliges all state parties to create legal frameworks for the effective 
protection of privacy including adequate complaint systems and remedies for the violation 
of this right. The HRC  made it clear that ‘confidentiality of correspondence should be 
guaranteed de jure and de facto’. 81 Correspondence ‘should be delivered to the addressee 
without interception and without being opened or otherwise read’.82 The Committee’s 
interpretation of the scope of the term ‘correspondence’ clearly covers NSA/GCHQ cyber 
surveillance of digital communications, as the term includes all electronic communications, 
such as email, 83  instant messages, together with telephonic and telegraphic 
communications.84 Electronic surveillance, wire-tapping and the recording of conversations 
is prohibited.85 In addition, the gathering and holding of personal information on computers, 
                                                                                                                                                                     
[…] digital surveillance […] may engage a State’s human rights obligations if that  
 surveillance involves the State’s exercise of power or effective control in relation  
 to digital communications infrastructure, wherever found, for example through  
direct tapping or penetration of that infrastructure. Equally, where the State 
exercises regulatory jurisdiction over a third party that physically controls the data, 
that State would have obligations under the Covenant. 
78 The Washington Post, ‘NSA Slide Shows Surveillance of Undersea Cables’ (2013) 
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/the-nsa-slide-you-havent-
seen/2013/07/10/32801426-e8e6-11e2-aa9f-c03a72e2d342_story.html>. Upstream 
collection programmes allow access to very high volumes of data both inside and outside 
the US and has been described as the ‘collection of communications on fibre cables and 
infrastructure as data flows past’ and is conducted under the following four major 
surveillance programmes- Fairview, Blarney, Stormbrew and Oakstar.  
79 UNGA, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms whilst Countering Terrorism Ben Emmerson QC’ (23 
September 2014) UN Doc A/69/397 para 41. 
80 ICCPR art 17, supra note 8. 
81 UNHRC, ‘General Comment No. 16: Article 17 (Right to Privacy). The Right to Respect of 
Privacy, Family, Home, and Correspondence and Protection of Honour and Reputation’ (8 
April 1988) UN Doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev para 8. 
82 ibid. 
83 UNHRC, ‘Concluding Observations on Sweden’ (2009) UN Doc CCPR/C/SWE/CO/6. 
84 UNHRC General Comment No. 16, supra note 81 para 8. 
85 ibid. 
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data banks and other devices, whether by public authorities or private individuals, must be 
subject to appropriate state regulation and safeguards.86 The HRC interpreted the phrase 
‘interference’ broadly, to include any measure that either directly, or indirectly infringes on 
an individual’s privacy interests.87 For these reasons, it is very likely that both NSA and 
GCHQ surveillance practices interfere with privacy because the mere collection and storage 
of data, including that which is publically accessible, constitutes an interference falling 
within the ambit of Article 17 ICCPR.  
Similarly, Article 8 ECHR protects everyone’s private life, home and correspondence from 
interference by a public authority, except on specific grounds provided in subparagraph 2. 88 
The extent of interference with the right to privacy in the context of states’ secret 
surveillance operations has been subject to an extensive analysis of the European Court of 
Human RightsECtHR on a number of occasions. A series of early cases dealing with the 
interception of telephone conversations applying various surveillance techniques by law 
enforcement agencies helped to develop a number of principles. Such cases as Klass and 
Others v Germany,89 Malone v United Kingdom,90 Halford v United Kingdom91 and Liberty 
and Others v United Kingdom92 established, inter alia, that wire tapping of telephone 
conversations, togethertoghther with the use of covert surveillance technologies invariably 
engages Article 8, since the notion of ‘private life’ and ‘correspondence’ extends to the 
interception of telephone communications and ‘metering’ practices.93 In Liberty the ECtHR 
explicitly stated that e-mail communications are also included in the ambit of ‘private life’ 
and ‘correspondence’. 94 The Court also ruled on the collection and storage of personal data 
by public authorities.95 Additionally, in  Weber and Saravia v Germany96 and Kennedy v UK97  
the ECtHR held that the legislation, which by its mere existence entails a threat of 
surveillance for all those, to whom it might be applied, impacted on freedom of 
communication between the users of the telecommunications services and thereby 
amounted in itself to an interference with the exercise of the rights under Article 8 ECHR.  
Most recently, the ECtHR engaged with domestic mass surveillance regimes in Roman 
Zakharov v Russia98 and Szabo and Vissy v Hungary.99 In Zakharov, the Grand Chamber of 
the ECtHR held that the Russian system for permitting surveillance across mobile networks 
                                                      
86 ibid, para 10. 
87 UNHRC Tooten v Australia (Communication No 488/1992) UN Doc 
CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 (1994). 
88 ECHR art 8, supra note 9. 
89 Klass and Others v Germany (App No 5029/71) (1978) 2 EHRR 214. 
90 Malone v United Kingdom (App No 8691/79) (1985) 7 EHRR 14. 
91 Halford v United Kingdom (App No 20605/92) (1997) 24 EHRR 523. 
92 Liberty and Others v United Kingdom (App No 58243/00) (2009) 48 EHRR 1. 
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95 see for example: Leander v Sweden (App No 9248/81) (1987) 9 EHRR 433; S and M Marper 
v UK (App No 30562/04) (2008) ECHR 1581; Shimovolos v Russia (App No 30194/09) (2011). 
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in the interests of crime prevention, which required the network operators to install 
equipment allowing the interception of all telephone communications without prior judicial 
authorisation, violated Article 8. Szabo concerned surveillance powers of the Hungarian 
intelligence agency contained in the Police Act 1994 (s 7/E(3)), including interception of 
electronic or computerised communications without the consent of the person concerned 
on anti-terrorist grounds. These powers were subject to ministerial, rather than judicial 
authorisation. They were not linked to a particular crime and required a warrant to relate 
only to premises, persons concerned, or ‘a range of persons’, being therefore potentially 
executable against any person. Given the fact that the scope of the measures could include 
virtually everyone in Hungary, that the ordering was entirely in the guise of the executive 
without an assessment of whether interception was strictly necessary, that new 
technologies enabled the Hungarian government to intercept vast amounts of data 
concerning even persons outside the original range of operations, together with an absence 
of any effective remedial measures, the Court concluded that there had been a violation of 
Article 8. 100 These latest judgements reinforce the ECtHR antagonism towards mass 
surveillance and signal its willingness to take a hard line in the currently pending cases 
against the UK government, including the Big Brother Watch.101 
   
 
4. Can Mass Cyber Surveillance Be Justified? 
 
In one word-no. Any justification put forward by the US and UK authorities must satisfy the 
requirements of Article 17 ICCPR and Article 8(2) ECHR. Unlike Article 8(2), Article 17 does 
not provide specific grounds limiting the right to privacy. However, as other non-absolute 
rights, Article 17 may be limited by proportionate measures designed to achieve a valid 
aim.102  Based on the practice of the HRC,103 as well as the wording of Article 8(2) and its 
interpretation by the ECtHR, the test for permissible limitations boils down to three main 
criteria, namely (a) ‘in accordance with the law’; (b) legitimate aim and (c) necessity and 
proportionality.  
 
(a) In Accordance with the Law  
 
Article 17 ICCPR prohibits ‘unlawful’ interference, meaning that ‘no interference can take 
place except in cases envisaged by the law’,104  which itself must comply with the objectives 
                                                      
100 European Court of Human Rights Registry, ‘Hungarian Legislation on Secret Anti-Terrorist 
Surveillance Does not Have Sufficient Safeguards Against Abuse’ (2016) 
<http://statewatch.org/news/2016/jan/echr-case-SZAB-%20AND-VISSY-v-%20HUNGARY-
prel.pdf.>. 
101 supra, note 74. 
102 Sara Joseph and Melissa Castan, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
Cases, Materials and Commentary (Oxford University Press 2014) 538. 
103 UNHRC General Comment No. 16, supra note 81 paras 3,4,8; UNHRC, ‘General Comment 
27. Freedom of Movement (Article 12)’ (1999) UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9 paras 14-15; 
Tooten v Australia supra note 87 para 8.3. 
104 supra note 81 para 10. 
 
 
 13 
of the Covenant105 and ‘be formulated with sufficient precision to enable an individual to 
regulate his or her conduct accordingly and it must be made accessible to the public. A law 
may not confer unfettered discretion.’106 The provision of ‘in accordance with the law’ in 
Article 8(2) ECHR similarly requires that surveillance measures must have ‘some basis in 
domestic law’, be accessible to the person concerned, be foreseeable as to its effects107 and 
be  relatively detailed.108  
The use of surveillance programmes, including Tempora do not meet these standards. First, 
there are very few states that have so far enacted primary legislation explicitly authorising 
such programmes.109 For example, there is no UK statute to date specifically authorising 
interception of communications involving the tapping of the undersea fibre-optic cables. 
RIPA, aimed at the interception of domestic and foreign telephone communications, has 
been simply adapted to the new reality of intercepting all internet traffic. As long as one end 
of a communication is outside the UK, RIPA warrants authorising ‘external’ communications. 
However, the distinction between ‘external’ and ‘internal’ communications in the context of 
digital communications is purely theoretical and makes no real difference in practice as to 
what information may be collected. As a result, the exact legal bases for these powers are 
unknown and not readily accessible, whilst their use is vague and unforeseeable. The UK 
government has acknowledged during the 2014 litigation against it in the Investigatory 
Powers Tribunal that it ‘considers that an “external communication” occurs every time a UK 
based person accesses a website located overseas, posts on a social media site overseas 
such as Facebook, uses overseas cloud storage or uses aon overseas email provider such as 
Hotmail or Gmail. Searches on Google are counted as external communications.’ 110 
Furthermore, the UK powers to bulk intercept external communications seem to have been 
used to monitor also domestic data. Indeed, at one point GCHQ was reportedly obtaining  
85% of all UK domestic traffic, including internet, via the international cables (using 
                                                      
105 ibid para 3. 
106 UNHRC, ‘General Comment No. 34. Article 19: Freedoms of Opinion and Expression’ 
(2011) UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/34 para 25. 
107 Zakharov v Russia, supra note 98. 
108 ibid, para 231. Zakharov reiterated the Court’s requirements set out in its earlier 
jurisprudence, in such cases as Huvig v France (App No 11105/84) (1990) 12 EHRR528; Klass 
v Germany supra note 89; Amman v Switzerland (App No 27798/95) (2000) 30 EHRR 843; 
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interception order; (c) limits of its duration (d) the procedures to be followed for examining, 
using and storing the data obtained; (e) the precautions to be taken when communicating 
the data to other parties, and (f) circumstances in which data obtained may, or must be 
erased or destroyed. 
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Tempora).111 Secondly, thus far the UK government has not satisfactorily justified the 
difference in treatment when collecting ‘internal’ and ‘external’ communications to 
establish that the latter practice is not discriminatory in line with the requirement of 
proportionality set out by the HRC in its General Comment No. 18112 and the ECtHR in 
Burden v UK.113 Therefore, the same principles regarding ‘in accordance with the law’ 
recently reiterated in Zakharov and Szabo in relation to domestic powers of surveillance 
must also apply to foreign, or external communications. On these bases alone, the 
continued practice of intercepting all external communications under RIPA fails this test, as 
there is no regard for the procedural safeguards against arbitrary interference by public 
authorities. For example, as bulk interception by its very nature does not specify the target, 
this breaches the obligation to identify the categories of people liable to interception and 
provides no limits on its duration. In Szabo the Courts specifically noted that under s 7/E 
Police Act 1994 it was possible for virtually any person in Hungary to be subjected to secret 
surveillance, as the legislation did not describe the categories of persons who in practice 
may be targeted. The only requirement was for the authorities to name the individuals, or 
the ‘range of persons’ to be intercepted to the responsible government minister, without 
demonstrating their actual, or presumed relation to any terrorist threat. Thirdly, The UK 
government has already been challenged on the legality of the interception of external 
communications based on Interception of Communications Act 1985 (ICA) in Liberty v UK.114 
The ICA did not indicate with sufficient clarity the scope, or manner of the exercise of 
surveillance and was therefore not ‘in accordance with the law’. Its successor, RIPA, is 
strikingly similar and will almost certainly fall foul of Article 8 on the same grounds. 
Likewise, s 702 FAA, designed ostensibly for an interception of foreign targets, does 
not satisfy the legality requirement, as it establishes a regime that allows the US 
government to conduct mass surveillance, including the communications of American 
citizens, without a warrant, or particularized suspicion.115 
  Clearly, the scope of what has been collected under Article 8(4) RIPA and s 702 FAA 
is unclear, as both statutes confer very broad discretion on the state agencies, allowing 
them not only to conduct untargeted surveillance abroad, but also to circumvent the 
requirements for legitimate use of surveillance powers at home. In that sense both 
provisions lack the necessary qualities of law. 
 
(b) Legitimate Aim 
 
A state must justify any interference on the basis of the specified legitimate aim. Article 17 
ICCPR does not enumerate an exhaustive list of public policy objectives that may form the 
                                                      
111 The Guardian, ‘MI5 Feared GCHQ Went “Too Far” Over Phone and Internet Monitoring’, 
(2013) <https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/jun/23/mi5-feared-gchq-went-too-far>.  
112 supra note 40. 
113 supra note 42. 
114 Liberty v UK, supra note 92.   
115 Electronic Frontier Foundation, ‘Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
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PRISM orders directed at specific companies have been used to access Americans’ 
communications, so long as the order targets at least 51% of foreign people.  
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basis of such a justification. Nevertheless, the prevention, suppression and investigation of 
acts of terrorism have been held to amount to a legitimate aim for the purposes of Article 
17.116   
Unlike Article 17 ICCPR, Article 8(2) ECHR does provide a list of legitimate aims, 
among them the interest of national security and economic well being of the country.117 As 
a general principle, the existence of legislation granting powers of secret surveillance over 
communications, including email, is necessary in the interest of national security.118  In 
addition, it has been held that the enhanced capacity of states to monitor all internet traffic 
has been recognized as a valid ‘basis of an arguable justification for mass surveillance of the 
Internet’ in the interest of prevention and suppression of global acts of terrorism.119 
However, states do not enjoy an unlimited discretion to subject persons within their 
jurisdictions to secret surveillance and may not, in the name of the struggle against 
espionage and terrorism adopt whatever measures they deem appropriate.120 Indeed, such 
measures are only tolerable in so far as the means provided for by the legislation to achieve 
these aims remain within the bounds of what is necessary in a democratic society.121 Lately, 
in Zakharov the ECtHR’s Grand Chamber rejected surveillance authorised on ‘national, 
military, economic or ecological security grounds’ as being insufficient, requiring that any 
authorisation must be based on a ‘reasonable suspicion against a person concerned’.122 This 
means that when authorising surveillance measures, an authorising body must be capable 
of verifying whether there are factual indications for suspecting that person of planning, 
committing, or having committed criminal act or acts endangering national security.123 The 
‘reasonable suspicion’ approach was not only endorsed, but also further elaborated on by 
the ECtHR in Szabo earlier this year. The phrase ‘necessary in a democratic society’ now 
requires that any secret surveillance must be strictly necessary in two senses: (a) as a 
general consideration for the safeguarding of democratic institutions; and (b) as a particular 
consideration for the obtaining of vital intelligence in an individual operation.124  
The official justifications by the US and UK governments regarding untargeted foreign 
surveillance are rare and mainly based on national security grounds, in particular fighting 
and preventing terrorism and crime.125 As such these grounds are too broad and unspecific 
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and therefore do not meet the criteria of ‘reasonable suspicion’. Instead, they bear all the 
hallmarks of ‘fishing expeditions’ that the ECHtR is particularly adverse to.126  
 
(c) Necessity and Proportionality of Mass Surveillance 
 
States must demonstrate that any interference with the right to privacy under Article 17 
ICCPR and Article 8(2) ECHR is a necessary means to achieving a legitimate aim. Establishing 
that the interference is necessary requires from a state to show not only that the 
interference with a person’s right meets a pressing social need, but that it is also 
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.127 This means that the interference cannot be 
greater than is necessary to address that pressing social need.128 Additionally, the measure 
in question must be the least intrusive instrument amongst those, which might achieve their 
protective function.129   
In the case of intrusion into internet privacy rights, proportionality involves balancing 
the extent of the intrusion against the specific benefits accruing to investigations 
undertaken by a public authority in the public interest.130 The principle of proportionality 
seems not to be satisfied in cases of the use of mass surveillance programmes by both the 
US and the UK authorities under Article 17 ICCPR. One reason is that the official success rate 
in fighting/preventing terrorism appears insignificant in relation to the scale of surveillance 
operations. The figures declared by the Obama Administration justifying their use of PRISM 
set the number of prevented terrorist threats at at least fifty,131 but these claims have been 
subsequently discredited. In Klayman v Obama132 it was declared that the US government 
was unable to ‘cite a single case in which analysis of the NSA’s bulk metadata collection 
actually stopped an imminent terrorist attack’.133 In addition, US President’s Review Group 
on Intelligence and Communications Technologies evidenced that mass surveillance 
impedes law enforcement efforts and recommended that significant steps should be taken 
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to protect privacy of non-US persons.134 In particular, it refuted the Administration’s claims 
regarding the number of lives saved as a result of metadata collection, advising that bulk 
surveillance programmes should be shut down.135 Moreover, according to the PACE report, 
mass surveillance does not appear to have contributed to the prevention of terrorist attacks, 
contrary to earlier assertions made by senior intelligence officials.136  
 Similar conclusion can be reached in the light of the European Court of Human 
RightsECtHR jurisprudence regarding the assessment of proportionality. In Leander v 
Sweden137 the ECtHR accepted that states should enjoy wide discretion, both in assessing 
the existence of a pressing social need and in choosing the means of achieving the 
legitimate aim of protecting national security. However, in Klass138 and later in Zakharov, 139 
the ECtHR emphasised that states do not enjoy an unlimited discretion to subject persons 
within their jurisdictions to secret surveillance and may not, in the name of the struggle 
against espionage and terrorism, adopt whatever measures they deem appropriate. Mass 
data collection programmes therefore appear to offend against the requirement that 
intelligence agencies must select the measure that is the least intrusive on human rights and 
thereby undermine the very essence of the right to privacy.140 
RMost recently, in Privacy International v Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs, the UK Investigatory Powers Tribunal held that the UK intelligence 
agencies, including GCHQ, operated an unlawful collection and retention regime of the data 
of the UK citizens for over a decade. 141 The claim concerned the acquisition, use, retention, 
disclosure, storage and deletion of Bulk Communications Data (BCD) obtained under s 94 of 
the Telecommunications Act 1984 and Bulk Personal Data Sets (BPDs) obtained under a 
variety of legal powers.142   The Tribunal found that the two regimes that operated between 
1998 and 2015 breached Article 8 ECHR, as they were neither accessible, nor foreseeable. 
Furthermore, there was no statutory oversight of the BCD, whilst that relating to the BPD 
lacked adequate judicial oversights.143 The Tribunal also stated that the two systems lacked 
an adequate oversight until after July 2015 with ‘no Codes of Practice relating to either the 
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BCD or BPD or anything approximating to them’.144 The Tribunal did not consider the issue 
of necessity and proportionality under Article 8 ECHR. Nevertheless, its conclusion as the 
the unlawfulness of both bulk metadata collection and the cataloguing of almost the entire 
UK population’s personal data does not seat well with the powers of acquisition and 
retention of communications data and bulk personal data sets under thein  the soon to be 
enacted Investigatory Powers Act 2016Bill.145 
 
It could therefore be concluded that PRISM, Tempora and other such programmes do 
not seem to have legal basis in domestic law, fail to satisfy the requirement of legitimate 
aim and are disproportionately intrusive. For these reasons they are in all probability 
unlawful under Article 17 ICCPR and Article 8 ECHR.  
 
 
The Future of Mass Surveillance 
 
The future of the internet as a medium for free and open exchange of information globally 
has been seriously undermined, as evidenced by the political fallout. To begin with, 
revelations that the NSA spied on even its closest allies have affected state-to-state 
relationships, with the Brazilian, German and Indian authorities expressing their outrage in 
the immediate aftermath of the Snowden disclosures.146 The trend for more ‘technological 
sovereignty’ and ‘data nationalization’ has also intensified, with both Brazil and the 
European Union recently announcing plans to lay $185 million fibre-optic cables between 
them to thwart US surveillance. 147  
A number of international and regional institutions have also acted swiftly in 
condemning unfettered mass surveillance. The UN General Assembly (UN GA), the Human 
Rights Council and the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) have 
gone to a considerable effort to address these issues. The UN GA adopted two Resolutions 
on the right to privacy- 68/167148 and 69/166,149 both affirming that people’s rights 
protected offline should also be safeguarded online. The OHCHR presented a report in June 
2014, which spelled out the violations of privacy in the context of Article 17 ICCPR, stating 
that governmental surveillance ‘is emerging as a dangerous habit rather than an exceptional 
measure’.150 In 2015 the Human Rights Council adopted Resolution 28/16 appointing a 
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Special Rapporteur on the rights to privacy, Professor Joseph Cannataci,  with the mandate 
to report on alleged violations of this right including in connection with the challenges 
arising from new technologies.151  
 
(a) Regulation of the Activities of Intelligence Agencies 
 
The first concrete proposal to date from an international organization addressing the 
working methods of intelligence services in the sphere of digital communications came from 
the Council of Europe (CoE) in the form of the Intelligence Codex.  Four simple rules were 
suggested for governing co-operation among the intelligence agencies. First, any form of 
mutual political, economic espionage must be prohibited without exception.152 Secondly, 
any intelligence activity on the territory of another member state should only be carried out 
with that state’s approval and within a statutory framework, that is for a specific reason of 
preventing crime/terrorism.153 Thirdly, the tracking, analysing and storing of mass data is 
strictly prohibited if that data is from non-suspected individual from a friendly state. Only 
information pertaining to legitimately targeted individuals may be collected on an 
exceptional basis for specific individual purposes, whilst any data that is stored, but not 
needed must be immediately destroyed.154 Finally, the intelligence agencies should be 
banned from forcing telecommunication and internet companies to grant them unfettered 
access to their massive databases of personal data  without a court order.155  
There can be no doubt that a binding treaty, such as the proposed Codex is 
necessary. The Council of Europe has provided a number of reasons as to why such an 
instrument is desirable. These include rebuilding trust among transatlantic partners, 
Member States of the CoE, as well as between citizens and their governments as being of 
utmost importance. 156  Moreover, ‘the political problems caused by “spying on friends” and 
the possible collusion between intelligence services for the circumvention of national 
restrictions show the need for states to come up with a generally accepted “codex” for 
intelligence agencies that would put and end to unfettered mass surveillance and confine 
surveillance practices to what is strictly needed for legitimate security purposes’.157  
That being the case, the question is how feasibley is the adopting of such a treaty? 
To date, states showed no real appetite to regulate peacetime espionage (be it in its 
traditional or cyber form) through hard law instrument.158 As a consequence, international 
law has been rather ambivalent regarding regulation of electronic surveillance, which falls 
within the broader concept of peacetime espionage.159 However, the Snowden disclosures 
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highlighted that there has been a marked shift in focus in relation to who is the subject of 
surveillance in the recent decades. Historically, signals intelligence efforts were 
concentrated on gathering data about decision making in foreign governments.160 Collecting 
information on private individuals was costly and not wide-spread. Consequently, public 
pressure to curtail espionage was minimal as it was not seen to affect average citizens 
abroad.161 This has dramatically changed and may encourage at least some states to 
consider agreeing the rules on how, when and why foreign governments may intercept their 
citizens’ communications. Having said that, a global international legal framework for 
surveillance coming to fruition any time soon is very much in doubt. This is partly due to the 
long standing disagreements relating to how cyberspace and the internet is to be governed 
represented by two competing ideologies. On the one hand, Russia and China support a 
sovereignty based governance model, with greater state controls and an enhanced role of 
the UN organizations, preferably the International Telecommunications Union.162 On the 
other hand, the United States and its allies propagate a multistakeholder approach, with 
continued input of diverse parties, such as governments, nongovernmental organizations 
(such as the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers and the Internet 
Engineering Task Force), the private sector, civil society, academia and individuals.163  The 
longstanding disagreements about cyberspace governance resulted in the breakdown of 
proceedings at the 2012 World Conference on International Telecommunications in Dubai 
and highlights deep divisions among states about the relationship between cyberspace and 
sovereignty.164 
 This does not necessarily mean that a multilateral treaty could not be achieved on a smaller 
scale, originating in the Council of Europe. The CoE has a successful track record regarding 
the negotiation of international treaties, as demonstrated by the Convention on Cybercrime 
2001 (the Budapest Convention)165 and Convention for the Protection of Individuals with 
Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data (Convention 108),166 both dealing with 
activities conducted in the cyber environment. They began life as regional, European 
instruments, but in time became international, albeit not universal, since they allow for 
accession by non-European countries. Thus, the Budapest Convention has been ratified by 
49 parties, among them four non-Council of Europe states who signed it (the US, Canada, 
Japan and South Africa) and five, including the US which also ratified it.167 Similarly, the 
‘globalization’ of Convention 108 beyond its European origins has been underway since the 
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start of this decade, when Uruguay acceded to it in 2013.168 The expansion of Convention 
108 is set to continue with Mauritius depositing its instruments of accession in 2016this year. 
Another Ffour other non-European countries (Cape Verde, Morocco, Senegal and Tunisia) 
are in various stages of the process.169 The Intelligence Codex too could not only become a 
regional treaty, but also provide an opportunity to other non-European states to become a 
party to it and thus have wider than Europe reach.  
 Thus far, the Codex has met with only one unfavourable response (the Netherlands) 
out of the 47 CoE Member States. In the absence of more adverse reactions from all the 
Member States it is difficult to speculate what the future of the Codex may be. The Codex is 
contained in Resolution 2045(2015) and Recommendation 2067(2015) proposing that the 
Committee of Ministers, (the CoE decision making body composed of foreign ministers of 
the contracting parties) initiates it. However, PACE resolutions and recommendations are 
non-legally binding.170 Recommendations contain proposals addressed to the Committee of 
Ministers and their implementation is within the competence of the foreign ministers of all 
Member States comprising the  Committee. They may either support the Codex and begin 
the process of negations, or reject it, as was the case with the Dutch authorities.171 If the 
Codex is rejected, the attempt to exert influence by the PACE on Council of Europe Member 
States to ban mass surveillance will undoubtedly be undermined. However, in view of the 
deep concerns and condemnation of these practices by the PACE, opting out  could lead to  
triggering Article 52 ECHR procedures.172  Pursuant to this provision the Secretary General, a 
senior official of the CoE, may require all 47 CoE Member States to report on how their mass 
surveillance practices comply with the ECHR and make their replies public. This could lead to 
more political pressure being put on governments to carefully consider the stance they may 
take regarding the proposed Codex. This is particularly pertinent in the case of all those 
counties, where draconian counter terrorism measures have been recently enacted, or are 
in the process of being adopted, such as the UK. 173  An example of the effectiveness of 
Article 52 ECHR initiative is the inquiry into secret detentions and illegal transfers of 
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detainees involving Council of Europe Member States in 2005. 174 The PACE Reports 
uncovered evidence of human rights violations and helped to put pressure on governments, 
leading to high profile international and national enquiries, which sought to bring those 
responsible to justice and led to developments of international law.175 The PACE has already 
requested that the Committee of Ministers draft its suggested Intelligence Codex and draw 
up guidelines for the 47 European governments the Council represents.176 Furthermore,  the 
author of the Mass Surveillance report, Rapporteur Omitzigt recommended that Article 52 
inquiry be launched in the wake of the ‘BND/NSA scandal’ in 2015.177 The allegations that 
the foreign intelligence agency of Germany (the BND) conducted surveillance on its 
European allies for the NSA caused Rapporteur Omtzigt to reiterate that ‘the Intelligence 
Codex lying down the rules of fair play applicable to the secret services of like-minded 
countries is urgently needed’ and urged national parliaments to start serious negotiations 
on the issue.178 Omtzigt’s concerns that the surveillance powers will grow further, whilst 
political oversights keep diminishing, resulting in a ‘runaway surveillance machine’,179 is a 
warning that all European states must heed.   
The UK plays a significant role within the Five Eyes alliance and its intelligence gathering 
capabilities are among the most advanced in Europe. The UK’s stance on signing up to the 
Intelligence Codex must be assessed in the context of that country’s 2016 decision to leave 
the European Union (Brexit), particularly in relation to the future relationship that the UK 
will forge with the EU in security and intelligence-gathering matters.  Britain could be 
amenable to the Codex for two reason. First, the objective of the Codex is to lay down rules 
governing cooperation and obtaining data, based on lawful surveillance measures. The 
Codex seeks to forbid unlawful practices (such as mass surveillance), not ban intelligence 
gathering altogether. Signing up to the Codex could help towards regaining public trust and 
political credibility at home and abroad, much undermined by the Snowden revelations. 
Secondly, although it is likely that post Brexit, the EU countries will continue to seek access 
to at least some of the information gathered by the UK intelligence services, the same is 
true of the UK. Britain relies on EU crime and intelligence databases and benefits from the 
access to EU intelligence, as acknowledged by the Prime Minister May.180 The Prime 
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Minister, in her speech on Brexit in October 2016 at the Conference of the Conservative 
Party envisaged that the new agreement with the EU will ‘include cooperation on law 
enforcement and counter terrorism work’.181  Were Britain to join the Codex, one matter 
that the government would have to consider is how to reconcile the powers it has granted 
to the intelligence community under the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 with the recent 
decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in such cases as Digital Rights 
Ireland182 and Tele2 Sverige AB v Post och183 (the Watson case). In that case the CJEU 
affirmed that the general and indiscriminate retention of data pursuant to the now expired 
UK Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 (DRIPA) is incompatible with the EU 
law as it  ‘exceeded the limit of what is strictly necessary and cannot be considered to be 
justified within a democratic society’. 184  The judgement may be significant for the 
Investigatory Powers Act 2016, as it contains similar data retention powers to DRIPA 2014 
and may have to be amended by either primary or secondary legislation. 
  If the proposal fails for a legally binding Intelligence Codex fails, an alternative 
solution could be a voluntary Intelligence Codex.185 Such a soft law option may be a viable 
alternative to law making  by treaty for a number of reasons. First, it may be easier for 
states to reach agreement, especially if they are not ready to assume legal obligations, but 
wish to undertake some kind of commitment short of a legally binding one. Secondly, soft 
law instruments are flexible and as such will normally be easier to supplement, amend or 
replace than treaties.186 A voluntary Intelligence Code could therefore have a strong effect, 
‘because those that do not abide by it could be accused of wrongful actions by their allies, 
thus eroding their credibility as cooperation partners’.187 In this sense, the voluntary Codex 
could be law-making in a similar way to multilateral treaties because it would evidence at 
least an element of good faith commitment, a desire to influence state practice, or express 
some of law making intention.188 However, as demonstrated by the recently annulled Safe 
Harbour agreement, non-legally binding schemes are easier to circumvent than hard law 
instruments.189 Arguably, a multilateral binding agreement would be more effective to close 
loopholes that states can currently exploit in order to circumvent legal limits placed on their 
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intelligence programmes. This is particularly the case in relation to ‘collusion for 
circumvention’, which still allows intelligence agencies to push the boundaries of their data 
collection powers at home by relying on data collected by their allies or third parties.190  
 
What would be an advantage of a hard law Intelligence Codex over and above the 
existing international human rights architecture? There are at least two reasons in support 
of the Codex, first the need for up to date norms under Article 17 ICCPR and secondly, to 
supplement the jurisprudence of the ECtHR on Article 8 ECHR. These points will be 
discussed below.   
 
(i) The Need to Modernise Article 17 ICCPR  
 
Needless to say, each state should prefer a world in which its officials and citizens were less 
often subject to foreign surveillance.191 However, to achieve reduced surveillance through 
an internationally binding treaty states must have clearly defined norms. This at present 
appears lacking, as the existing international law under Article 17 ICCPR, in particular its 
General Comment No. 16 issued in 1988, has not kept pace with the rapid developments in 
surveillance and information technologies. As a consequence, the law on privacy is outdated 
and needs to be modernized.  
The past practice of the HRC set a precedent for revising or replacing general 
comments.192 The HRC has been motivated by the need to provide greater detail and more 
authoritative guidance on a content of a particular article, as well as the need to ensure that 
general comments reflect the changing realities and incorporate developments in the 
law.193 General Comment No. 16 is no exception. Although it sets out the core concepts 
contained in Article 17, it has lagged behind the technology developments in modern 
communications and surveillance practices. Consequently, new general comment on Article 
17 ICCPR must provide explicit articulation of what is the right to privacy of communications 
in the digital sphere and spell out the content of this right to ensure its effective protection 
and enforcement. Currently General Comment No. 16 shortcomings relate to the lack of 
explicit recognition of such matters as banning untargeted, mass surveillance,194 bulk 
metadata collection and retention; 195 protecting metadata; 196 intelligence services/law 
enforcement access to communications data held by third party service providers and 
internet companies including in a ‘cloud’; the relationship between private companies and 
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governments; 197 biometric data gathering (through for example finger printing, facial 
recognition software) and transborder access to non-publically available data circumventing 
the requirements of the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties. In addition, some matters must 
be settled beyond doubt, such as the extraterritorial application of human rights and equal 
treatment of citizens and foreigners, as well as specifying the circumstances when the right 
to privacy may be restricted. 198  
 
(b) The Need to Supplement the ECtHR Jurisprudence under Article 8 ECHR 
 
The PACE report indicated that the Intelligence Codex would adopt the safeguards devised 
by the European Court of Human Rights for surveillance.199 However, these safeguards 
provide only minimum standards200 that Mmember Sstates must adhere to and need to be 
reinforced by detailed rules in at least four areas, namely (a) legality- in relation to the so 
called ‘contact chaining’; (b) legitimate aim; (c) judicial authorisation; and (d) complaints 
mechanism- user notification. 
 
(i) Legality 
 
In such cases as Klass, 201  Malone, 202  Weber, 203  Liberty, 204  Rotaru v Romania, 205 
Zakharov206 and Szabo,207 the Strasbourg Court has developed minimum standards, which 
domestic law must meet in order to be compatible with Article 8 outlined in part 4(a) 
above,208 among them the requirement to specify the categories of people liable to have 
their communication intercepted.  In gathering information, state authorities often build a 
human network around an individual of interest to them by gathering telephone and/or 
internet metadata related to other persons with whom that individual may be in contact 
and who are usually one or two stops (‘hops’) away from him/her. This is known as ‘contact 
chaining’. National legislation would usually set out these powers in terms of ‘relevance’ for 
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the investigation of terrorism or crime.209  The Strasbourg Court has not yet addressed this 
issue in the context of interception of internet metadata,210 yet in this case the ‘relevance’ 
criterion gives potential for expanding the net of surveillance greatly to cover huge numbers 
of people without any connection whatsoever to crime or terrorism.211 Contact chaining 
must therefore be regulated by placing strict limits on the power to query collected bulk 
metadata.  
 
(ii) Legitimate Aim 
 
The Zakharov and Szabo cases illustrate the Court’s acknowledgement that the legal 
threshold of ‘national security’ is dangerously broad especially in the context of 
mobile/electronic communications, which contrasts with its earlier more permissive 
approach in Weber and Kennedy. The ECtHR now favours a stringent test based on 
reasonable suspicion and this criterion should be adopted in the Codex, as a legal 
requirement for all surveillance powers. As for  allowing the collection of signals intelligence 
for ‘economic well being of the country’, it has been feared that this may give rise to the 
suspicion of economic espionage.212 The problem is that there seems to be no limits set out 
by the ECtHR jurisprudence regarding when data may be collected pursuant to this ground. 
One view was that to avoid nations acting for nefarious purposes cloaked in the ‘economic 
well being’, this criterion must be accompanied by clear prohibition of economic espionage, 
buttressed by effective oversight and prohibitions on letting government departments, or 
administrative agencies concerned with promoting trade, task the signals intelligence 
agencies.213  
 
(iii) Judicial Authorisation 
 
In order to comply with the ECHR a secret surveillance programme must be subject 
to independent supervision, which may be either judicial or non-judicial.214 In past cases, 
the ECtHR held that judicial authorisation is ‘in principle desirable and ‘offer[s] the best 
guarantee of independence, impartiality and a proper procedures’,215 but stopped short of 
requiring this in all circumstances. In Klass the ECtHR found that oversight by a non-judicial 
body was allowed, where that body is sufficiently ‘independent of the authorities carrying 
out the surveillance’.216 Yet,  the issue of impartiality in cases where authorisation has been 
in the guise of a non-judicial bodies, such as an official of the Post Office, gave the Court 
                                                      
209 For example in the US the access to stored telephony metadata will be granted on the 
basis of ‘reasonable articulable suspicion’ individually approved by the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court under s 215 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. 
210 European Commission for Democracy Through Law (the Venice Commission), ‘The 
Democratic Oversight of Signals Intelligence Agencies’ (20-21 March 2015), paras 98, 81. 
211 ibid, para 10, 57. 
212 ibid. 
213 ibid para 73, 73. 
214 Weber supra note 96; Klass supra note 89; Zakharov supra note 98; Szabo supra note 99. 
215 Klass, ibid para 87. 
216 ibid para 56. 
Formatted: Indent: First line:  1.27
cm, Don't adjust space between Latin
and Asian text
 
 
 27 
reasons for concern.217 An opportunity to require that all states must provide that only 
judicial authorisation would suffice arose lately in Zakharov, but the Court held that ‘control 
by an independent body, normally a judge with special expertise, should be the rule and 
substitute solution, the exception warranting close scrutiny’.218 Szabo was yet another 
confirmation that judicial control of secret surveillance is preferable, but not obligatory.219 
In the sphere of mass surveillance, the key defect therefore of the current authorisation 
regime is the Court’s repeated reticence to make the requirement of judicial authorisation 
mandatory across jurisdictions.  
 
(iv) Complaints Mechanism 
 
  Under Article 13 ECHR individuals have a right to an effective remedy in their 
national courts in cases where a public authority has infringed their Convention rights.220 
Part of this entitlement is the right of citizens to be informed of their data being collected 
and/or that they have been subject of surveillance, known as user notification.221 However, 
the issue of whether and when an individual may expect to be informed is far from settled. 
In Klass, the ECtHR found that states are not required to disclose that they have ordered or 
conducted surveillance in a particular case, nor must they notify a person after the 
surveillance has ceased.222 The ECtHR considered that is was not feasible in practice to 
require post interception notification in all cases.223 In the subsequent cases the ECtHR 
showed a clear tendency towards the establishment of this as a right. 224  For example, in 
Ekimdzhiev v Bulgaria225 the ECtHR held that the missing notification of the individual after 
surveillance violated both Article 8 and Article 13 ECHR, but fell short of finding that 
notification was a necessary requirement of domestic surveillance laws in general, stating 
that authorities should issue a notification to an individual who had been secretly 
monitored.226    
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper demonstrated that the untargeted mass foreign surveillance is unlawful under 
international human rights law. However, although in principle the right to privacy of 
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communications under Article 17 ICCPR and Article 8 ECHR apply to extraterritorial 
surveillance, it has become apparent that there are a number of shortfalls in these 
frameworks as they are either outdated and/or require additional legal standards. Equally, 
the move towards greater legislative surveillance powers in some European countries, 
particularly the UK Investigatory Powers Act 2016 Bill, as a result of an increased number of 
terrorist attacks suggests that the calls from the UN organizations and human rights bodies 
have been ignored. Consequently, the problem of untargeted foreign cyber surveillance 
remains inadequately dealt with. One solution is that proposed by the Council of Europe, 
which called on its Member States to agree on a multilateral Intelligence Codex for their 
intelligence services, which would put an end to the unfettered mass surveillance and 
confine surveillance practices to that, which is strictly needed for legitimate security 
purposes. The Codex would lay down precisely what is allowed and what is prohibited 
between allies and partners, clarify what the intelligence agencies can do, how they 
cooperate and how allies should refrain from spying on each other.227 Much consideration 
would have to be given to such a framework in terms of its implementation and 
enforcement on the national level not to mention circumscribing how the intelligence 
agencies are to operate to comply with the requirements of Article 8 ECHR. Nevertheless, 
this paper considers the Codex a step in the right direction. It not only has a significant 
symbolic value, since it is the first attempt to engage in an international dialogue relating to 
espionage, but also may result in an agreement reached on a voluntary basis. In this sense, 
it is a positive development.   
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